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contract becomes merged in the decree and thereby loses its contractual
nature at least to the extent that modification is permitted,q rights there-
after resting on the decree and not the agreement; 10 and this is so even
.where the decree settles property rights.1
The logic of the court in holding that a dead man has no duty to pay
alimony is unassailable, yet in reaching this result two prior Missouri
cases' had to be expressly overruled. It is submitted that such a holding
flies in the face of the statute, 3 and if permitted to stand, it will be an
easy matter for the parties by contract to defeat its purpose. They should
not by private agreement be permitted to abrogate laws enacted from
consideration of public concern,' 4 since they are presumed to contract with
the statute in mind.' 5 Furthermore the state has a social and financial
interest in the performance of the husband's duty to support his wife,16
and since alimony in a divorce a vinculo is but a statutory substitute for
this common law duty,17 it would be more in accord with the public inter-
est to permit regulation. Indeed the statute itself reserves the power to
modify the decree to comport with the changed circumstances of the par-
ties.'s
J. L. A.
APPEAL AND ERROR-COURTS-EJECTMENT TO RECOVER POSSESSION AS
ACTION INVOLVING TITLE-[Missouri.-The petition in an ejectment suit
alleged that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of certain real
estate, unlawfully withheld by the defendant and that the defendant had
(2d) 990 (1932); Ross v. Ross, 1 Cal. (2d) 381, 35 P. (2d) 316 (1934);
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 132 Cal. App. 609, 23 P. (2d) 50 (1933); Canary
v. Canary, 89 Colo. 483, 3 P. (2d) 802 (1931); Maginnis v. Maginnis, 323
Ill. 113, 153 N. E. 654 (1926); Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E.
820 (1925) ; Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N. E. 251 (1930) ; Eddy
v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N. W. 868 (1933); Randall v. Randall, 181
Minn. 18, 231 N. W. 413 (1930); Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 2 P. (2d)
131 (1931) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 53 R. I. 326, 166 Atl. 686 (1933). For a
collection of earlier cases and a statement that this is the general rule see
58 A. L. R. 630.
9. Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932).
10. Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925).
11. Belding v. Huttonlocker, 177 Iowa 440 (1916); Skinner v. Skinner,
205 Mich. 243, 171 N. W. 383 (1919); Lally v. Lally, 152 Wis. 56, 138
N. W. 651 (1912); Goldfish v. Goldfish, 184 N. Y. Supp. 512 (1920); affd.
230 N. Y. 606, 130 N. E. 912 (1921).
12. Brown v. Brown, 209 Mo. App. 416, 239 S. W. 1093 (1932); Hayes v.
Hayes, 75 S. W. (2d) 614 (Mo. App., 1934).
13. R. S. Mo. 1929, sees. 1355, 1361.
14. Walter v. Walter, 189 Ill. App. 345 (1914).
15. Smith v. Smith, 94 Cal. App. 35 (1932); Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill.
146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925).
16. Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn. 256, 152 At]. 302 (1930).
17. 2 Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) sec. 1796, 1797.
18. Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich 328, 249 N. W. 868 (1933); R. S. Mo. 1929,
sees. 1355, 1361.
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committed various acts of waste upon the land; and prayed for possession
of the land. The defendant alleged facts supporting a claim of ownership
of the land. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for possession. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, held that where an action is to recover the
possession of realty, and to recover damages, and the defendant asserts
ownership merely as a defence to the action for possession, and the judg-
ment is for possession, title is only incidentally involved, and the Supreme
Court is precluded from taking jurisdiction of an appeal.1
The immediate problem in the principal case, whether an appeal in an
ejectment suit in which the issues correspond to those raised in the principal
case lies to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, 2 is largely a
problem peculiar to Missouri. In neighboring jurisdictions either such
problems do not exist or there is a simple solution of them available. In
Kansas,3 Arkansas, 4 and Oklahoma,5 no difficulty arises as there is no
intermediate Court of Appeals. In Indiana the constitution provides that
the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction as provided by statute,6 and
by statute direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court in cases involving the
delivery of possession of real property or the sale thereof.7 In Tennessee
the constitution provides for appeals to the Supreme Court in all cases in
which appellate jurisdiction is not conferred on the Civil Court of Appeals.8
It is provided by statute that the Civil Court of Appeals shall have juris-
diction excepting ejectment suits.9 Illinois permits appeals directly to the
Supreme Court where a freehold is involved.1o But a freehold must be
directly and not merely collaterally, contingently, or incidentally involved
1. Ballenger v. Windes, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (Mo., 1936) Div. 1.
2. Const. of Mo. (1875) art. 6, sec. 12, which gives the Supreme Courtjurisdiction in cases involving the title to real estate. For a general dis-
cussion of the Missouri cases on this section, see Note, U. Mo. Bul., Law
Series 41, p. 30. The author concludes that in regard to ejectment suits it
may be safely considered the rule that appellate jurisdiction is in the Su-
preme Court.
3. Const. of Kan. (1859) art. 3, sec. 3, provides for a Supreme Court
with such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law. A Court of
Appeals was established in 1895, Law 1895, c. 96 sec. 2 which was abol-
ished in 1901, Law 1901 c. 278 sec. 4-7. Today the only limitation on ap-
peals to the Supreme Court is that the amount must exceed $100 unless
title to real estate is involved which is an express exception. R. S. Kan.
1923, c. 60 sec. 3303.
4. Const. of Ark. (1874) art. 7 sec. 4, provides for a Supreme Court
which has appellate jurisdiction in all cases except as otherwise provided
by the constitution. Only limitation on appeals is the amount must exceed
$50. Crawford Civil Code (1934) sec. 16.
5. Const. of Old. (1907) art. 7 sec. 2 provides for appellate jurisdiction
in all civil cases at law and equity.
6. Const. of Ind. (1851) art. 7, sec. 4.
7. Burns St. Ann. (1914) sec. 1392.
8. Const. of Tenn. (1834) art. 6 sec. 2.
9. Act (1907) c. 82 sec. 7. See State v. Alexander, 132 Tenn. 439, 178
S. W. 1107 (1915) ; Reeves v. Hayni, 138 Tenn. 717, 164 S. W. 780 (1914).
10. Const. of Ill. (1870) art. 6 sec. 11, Smith Hurd Ann. St. (1935)
c. 110, sec. 199.
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before appeal is permitted.11 There it was decided in 1878 that an action
of ejeetment directly involves the freeheld, and that appeals must be made
directly to the Supreme Court.'? Only two limitations have been placed on
this case. The first is that the question concerning the freehold must be
involved on the appeal, and must be assigned as error.13 The other is that
the freehold is not involved on appeal if the defendant may arrest the
proceedings by making a payment or doing some act to prevent the dis-
turbance of his title.' 4
The Missouri Courts have generally held that before an appeal lies
directly to the Supreme Court title must be directly and not merely inci-
dentally or collaterally involved. 1" The issue then arises as to whether the
action of ejectment involves title directly. In Dunn '. Miller 0 one of the
first cases on point, the Supreme Court said that ejectment is a case within
the meaning of "involving title to real estate." A few years later the Court
of Appeals of its own motion transferred two cases to the Supreme Court
because they were ejectment suits.' 7 Later the courts recognized the limi-
tation that ejectment suits do not necessarily involve title, and if title is
conceded to be in one party and the controversy is merely over possession,
appeal will not lie to the Supreme Court.' s In two very recent cases, the
Maxwell case, decided by Division no. 1, and the Tooker case decided by
Division no. 2, it was held that even though the judgment is for possession,
if title has to be determined to reach the judgment, title is involved so as
to permit appeals to the Supreme Court.'0
The criticism of the principal case is that it expressly overrules its own
divisional opinion in the Maxwell case, and the decision of Division no. 2,
in the Tooker case, relying mainly on the Nettleton Bank Case20 which held
that the title must be taken from one person and given to another for an
appeal to lie directly to the Supreme Court. However, that case is not
applicable to the present case, as it dealt with an appeal from a Probate
11. Wilson v. Labhardt, 350 Ill. 165, 182 N. E. 752 (1932); Kogy v.
Lube, 357 Ill. App. 512, 192 N. E. 559 (1934).
12. Hartshorn v. Dawson, 2 Ill. App. 80 (1878).
13. Carney v. Quinn, 358 Ill. 446, 193 N. E. 455 (1935).
14. Becker v. Fink, 273 Ill. 560, 113 N. E. 49 (1916).
15. If neither party asks for an adjudication of title yet it is necessary
for the court to determine title in order to render the judgment, then title
is only incidentally involved, and no appeal lies to the Supreme Court.
Davis v. Watson, 158 Mo. 192, 59 S. W. 65 (1900); Hilton v. City of St.
Louis, 129 Mo. 192, 31 S. W. 771 (1895); Nettleton Bank v. McGaughey's
Estate, 318 Mo. 948, 2 S. W. (2d) 771 (1928).
16. Dunn v. Miller, 96 Mo. 324, 9 S. W. 640 (1888).
17. Bell v. Winkleman, 73 Mo. App. 451 (1898); Mitchell v. Blatt, 76
Mo. App. 408 (1898).
18. Sasse v. Sparkman, 53 S. W. (2d) 261 (Mo., 1932). See cases cited
in the opinion.
19. Tooker v. Missouri Power and Light Co., 80 S. W. (2d) 691, 101
A. L. R. 365 (Mo., 1935) by Division 2; Williams v. Maxwell, 82 S. W.
(2d) 270 (Mo., 1935) by Division 1.
20. Nettleton Bank v. MeGaughey's Estate, 318 Mo. 938, 2 S. W. (2d)
771 (1928).
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Court order to sell real estate for the payment of a widow's allowance and
not ejectment. 21 Also, the Nettleton Bank Case,22 cited with approval Force
v. Van Patton,23 which held that ejectment is an action which involves title
to real estate, and permits direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Not only
is the authority of the principal case faulty, but also the logic of the
proposition is with the dissenting opinion. Ejectment today is more than
a possessory action, it is a mode of trying title and the plaintiff must re-
cover on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his ad-
versaries.2- In the present case title was put in issue by the defendant
pleading facts showing him to be the owner. Thus under the decisions of
the Tooker case and the Maxwell case appeal should lie to the Supreme
Court. As is pointed out in the most recent decision on the subject,25 by
Division no. 2, that until there is a decision en banc on the point, because
of the absurd conflict between Division no. 1 in the Ballenger case and
Division no. 2 in the Tooker case, appeals to the Supreme Court will turn
not upon the constitutional provision but rather upon the Division to which
the case is assigned.
R. L. S.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT OF JUDGES-[Oklahoma].--On his
return to private practice, disbarment proceedings were commenced against
a former county judge for private acts of moral turpitude" committed
while he occupied his judicial office. Held; the Board of Governors of the
state bar (of Oklahoma) have the jurisdiction and authority to hear charges
against a practicing lawyer of disbarable offenses involving moral turpi-
tude rendering him unfit to be permitted to continue the practice of law,
even though the offenses evidencing such loss of character occurred while
he theretofore held judicial office.2
This case is in line with the weight of authority, although the Oklahoma
21. Supra, note 20.
22. Supra, note 20.
23. Force v. Van Patton, 149 Mo. 499, 50 S. W. 906 (1899) which holds
that ejectment is an action which involves title to real estate.
24. Ballenger v. Windes, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (Mo. 1936). The dissent
points out that at the time of Blackstone ejectment was the only way to try
title. This was the rule in Missouri down to 1897 when a special statute
was enacted to try title. Mo. St. Ann. sec. 1520, p. 1682. In Missouri the
action of ejectment to do away with the fiction of lease, entry and ouster,
allows the plaintiff to plead only possession. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1365-1370.
However, the plaintiff must prove he is legally entitled to possession and
must recover by the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his
adversaries when title is put in issue. Brown v. Simpson, 201 S. W. 898
(Mo., 1918).
25. Welsh v. Brown, 96 S. W. (2d) 345 (Mo., 1936) by Div. 2.
1. The case does not specify the particular acts of moral turpitude in-
volved.
2. Weston v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 61 P. (2d) 229 (Olda.,
1936).
19371
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss2/18
